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Abstract
A series of four experiments measured the transfer of perceptual learning in object recognition. Subjects viewed backward-
masked, gray-scale images of common objects and practiced an object naming task for multiple days. In Experiment 1, recognition
thresholds decreased on average by over 20% over 5 days of training but increased reliably following the transfer to a new set of
objects. This suggests that the learning was specific to the practiced objects. Experiment 2 ruled out familiarity with strategies
specific to the experimental context, such as stimulus discrimination, as the source of the improvement. Experiments 3 and 4 found
that learning transferred across changes in image size. Learning could not be accounted for solely by an improvement in general
perceptual abilities, nor by learning of the specific experimental context. Our results indicate that a large amount of learning took
place in object-specific mechanisms that are insensitive to image size. © 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The human visual system recognizes objects accurately
while discounting factors that greatly change the visual
image, such as viewing angle and viewing distance.
Perceptual psychologists have developed a variety of
experimental methods to break recognition into iden-
tifiable components. This paper uses perceptual learning1
to identify the mechanisms that underlie recognition of
everyday objects. We use learning to reveal mechanisms
that are specific to individual objects, and then show that
these mechanisms are insensitive to changes in image size.
The methods developed here can be used to study many
other aspects of object recognition.
For many tasks, human visual performance improves
dramatically with practice. Examining how this practice
transfers to different stimuli can reveal properties of
visual mechanisms2. For example, practicing a Vernier
acuity task with a horizontal stimulus leads to improve-
ment mainly for the practiced stimulus; learning does not
transfer to unpracticed orientations (e.g. Fahle, 1994).
This pattern suggests that Vernier acuity is not produced
by one indivisible mechanism. Rather, multiple mecha-
nisms exist, each one responsible for a narrow range of
orientations. Most studies adopting this approach have
focused on relatively early stages of visual processing,
using tasks such as Vernier acuity and pop-out (e.g.
Karni & Sagi, 1991; Ahissar & Hochstein, 1993; Fahle
& Edelman, 1993). This paper uses a similar logic to
identify mechanisms responsible for recognition of com-
mon objects.
Prior studies of long-term perceptual learning in
recognition have not used common objects. Instead,
subjects made fine discriminations on novel shapes
* Corresponding author. Tel.: 1-310-267-2030; fax: 1-310-206-
5895; http:::rocky.psych.ucla.edu:furmansk.
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1 The term perceptual learning has many interpretations and some-
times refers to improvement on a known stimulus dimension. How-
ever, we adopt a broader definition, as outlined by Gibson (1969):
‘Perceptual learning refers to an increase in the ability to extract
information from the environment, as a result of experience and
practice …’. A similar definition has been used by several other
experimenters (e.g. Karni & Sagi, 1991).
2 In this paper, mechanism refers to a behaviorally identifiable
component of perceptual processing. An example of a perceptual
mechanism is a spatial frequency channel (e.g. Graham, 1989).
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(Tarr & Pinker, 1989; Bulthoff & Edelman, 1992; Edel-
man & Bulthoff, 1992; Edelman, 1995; Liu, Knill &
Kersten, 1995; Tarr, 1995; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997;
Gauthier, Williams, Tarr & Tanaka 1998). However,
these studies have all examined subordinate-level recog-
nition (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Braem,
1976). It is possible that different mechanisms exist for
basic-level and subordinate-level recognition (Bulthoff,
Edelman & Tarr, 1995; Hummel & Stankiewicz, 1996;
but also see Edelman, 1995; Edelman & Duvdevani-Bar
1997; Tarr & Gauthier, 1998). Accordingly, previous
studies of perceptual learning in recognition may not
generalize to recognition of common objects.
Common objects have been used in some studies
measuring viewpoint specificity (e.g. Murray, Jolicoeur,
McMullen & Ingleton, 1993; Liu, 1996) and picture
naming (Bartram, 1973, 1974). However, these studies
measured learning that occurred within a single day.
Such rapid learning may reflect ‘fast perceptual learn-
ing,’ whose mechanisms may differ from those responsi-
ble for learning that occurs over many days (Karni &
Sagi, 1993).
The experiments reported here measure the transfer
of perceptual learning in order to reveal mechanisms
that perform basic-level recognition. Subjects practiced
recognizing objects for multiple days, which resulted in
improved performance in a naming task. Subjects were
then tested on new stimuli; transfer was measured by
comparing performance on the trained and new stimuli.
The pattern of transfer provides evidence about the
nature of the mechanisms that changed with practice.
These results will constrain theories of recognition if
learning is due to changes in the same mechanisms that
support unpracticed, everyday object recognition.
Perceptual learning in object recognition, however,
might result from changes in two alternative types of
mechanisms. First, learning could be due to improve-
ment in general mechanisms. Training might improve
subjects’ general perceptual abilities, such as overall
visual sensitivity. Second, learning could reflect devel-
opment of very specific mechanisms. Subjects might
learn to use strategies that take advantage of the exper-
imental context. For example, they could learn to dis-
criminate between the particular stimuli used in the
study.
Experiments 1 and 2 rule out both alternatives and
validate perceptual learning as a technique for studying
basic-level object recognition. Experiment 1 establishes
the basic learning method and tests the generality of
learning by measuring transfer to new objects. Experi-
ment 2 tests the specificity of learning by measuring
transfer to a new experimental context. Finally, Experi-
ments 3 and 4 demonstrate the mechanisms that im-
prove with practice are insensitive to changes in size.
Together the results of these experiments establish per-
ceptual learning as a powerful technique for studying
the mechanisms of basic-level recognition.
2. Experiment 1
Experiment 1 tested whether recognition of common
objects improves with practice and measured the gener-
ality of the improvement. Performance was measured
using an object-naming task. Subjects viewed briefly
presented gray-scale images of objects that were fol-
lowed by a pattern mask. They responded by typing the
name of the object and were provided with feedback.
Subjects practiced the task on a small number of ob-
jects for 5 consecutive days and on the sixth day were
tested on a new set of objects.
We expected that recognition would improve with
practice and that this improvement would be object
specific: Switching to a new set of objects following
training should produce a decrease in performance. If
learning is object specific, then it cannot be explained as
an improvement of general perceptual abilities.
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
Five observers participated in the experiment, includ-
ing both authors. Observer SAE was very experienced
at viewing stimuli under similar speeded conditions.
Other subjects had little or no practice on this task.
Subjects’ visual acuity was normal or corrected-to-
normal.
2.1.2. Stimuli
Digitized gray-scale images of 60 common objects
(see Appendix A; for examples, see Fig. 1) were pre-
sented to subjects using a Macintosh computer. ImagesFig. 1. Two examples of the stimuli and a sample mask image.
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Fig. 2. Typical data and psychometric functions for one subject.
Percent correct is plotted as a function of exposure duration. Filled
circles show performance on Day 1 and open circles show Day 5.
Smooth curves are Weibull functions fit to each day’s data (see text
for details). Dashed lines show each day’s threshold, which is the
exposure duration that yields performance of approximately 63%
correct.
1997) for MATLAB (Mathworks, Inc.). The display’s
mean luminance was 37 cd:m2.
Each daily session began with a series of 2 s displays
in which each object was presented along with its name.
The remainder of the session consisted of blocks of
recognition trials. Each trial began with a 750 ms
presentation of a fixation point on a mean field. A
stimulus image was then presented for one of eight
exposure durations (13, 27, 40, 53, 67, 80, 93, or 107
ms)3. The image was immediately followed by a 505 ms
presentation of the pattern mask. Subjects responded
by typing the first four letters of the object name.
Exposure durations were chosen using a two-down,
one-up staircase procedure. On error trials, the correct
object name was displayed for 1000 ms before the
beginning of the next trial.
2.1.4. Design
The experiment used three sets of 20 objects; no
object was in more than one set. Subjects trained on
one set of objects for five consecutive days and were
then tested on a new, transfer set on the 6th day. Each
daily session consisted of 10 blocks of 80 trials. In each
block, exposure durations were controlled using two
randomly interleaved staircases of 40 trials each. Daily
sessions lasted approximately 1 h. The three object sets
were counterbalanced between conditions (training and
transfer) using a modified between-subjects Latin
square.
2.2. Results
All the data reported here were analyzed using the
same procedure. For each subject, psychometric func-
tions were generated for each daily session by plotting
average percent correct as a function of exposure
duration4. Thresholds were estimated from the psycho-









where pˆ is the estimated percent correct, d is exposure
duration, the free parameter a is the threshold where
performance equals 63.2%, and the fixed parameter b,
the slope of the function, was set at 3.5.5 Parameters
were estimated using a maximum-likelihood procedure
(Watson, 1979).
Fig. 3. Experiment 1: individual-subject thresholds are plotted as a
function of training day. Horizontal lines show individual subjects.
Circles represent data for trained objects and crosses represent data
for new objects.
were presented at 12.5% of their original contrast in
order to increase task difficulty and avoid ceiling ef-
fects. The masking stimulus was a high-contrast, gray-
scale image of randomly generated intersecting black
and white lines. Images were expanded evenly until
each image just fit in a rectangle subtending 11.59.3°
of visual angle.
2.1.3. Procedure
Stimuli were presented on a 75 Hz AppleVision AV
display using the Psychophysics toolbox (Brainard,
3 Actual exposure durations were multiplies of the 75 Hz monitor
refresh rate. Reported values are rounded to the nearest millisecond.
4 The data were first corrected for guessing using the formula:
p (xg):(1g), where x is the raw proportion correct, p is the
corrected proportion, and g is likelihood of guessing correctly.
5 Initially, psychometric functions were fit using two free parame-
ters (i.e. a and b). The fixed value for b was the average of those
obtained in the initial fits. The quality of the fits for the one and two
free parameter models did not differ reliably.
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Fig. 2 shows psychometric functions fit to one sub-
ject’s data for Days 1 and 5. The dashed lines indicate
thresholds where performance is 63.2% correct. Train-
ing produced a leftward shift of the psychometric func-
tion and a corresponding decrease in threshold.
Fig. 3 shows individual subject thresholds plotted for
each day in Experiment 1. Thresholds decreased during
training with the same object set (Days 1–5), but
increased following the switch to a new object set (Day
6). Subject SAE had extensive experience with the task,
but not with the stimuli. Though his overall thresholds
were lower than other subjects’, the amount of percep-
tual learning was comparable to that observed in other
subjects.
In order to confirm that the shifts in thresholds
corresponded to reliable changes in the raw data for
individual subjects, we tested whether performance im-
proved between Days 1 and 5. For each subject, we
conducted a x2 test to determine if the distribution of
correct responses at each exposure duration for Day 1
was independent of the distribution of responses for
Day 5. More specifically, x2 contingency table entries
were the number of correct responses, and the rows and
columns represented the day of training and the expo-
sure duration, respectively. Improvement from Day 1 to
Day 5 reveals itself in this test as independence in the
contingency table, because the entries for the two rows
(corresponding to Days 1 and 5) would not be equal.
Such an improvement in performance would result in
more correct responses at lower exposure durations. All
five subjects showed significant learning between Day 1
and Day 5, minimum x2(6, N800)191.56, PB
0.001. All five subjects also showed a significant decre-
ment in performance between the trained stimuli set on
Day 5 and the new set on Day 6, min x2(6, N800)
48.08, PB0.001.
In order to reduce the between-subject variability
caused by differences in starting performance, change
scores were computed and then normalized by dividing
them by Day 1 thresholds, yielding percent-change
scores. For example, subject SAE’s starting thresholds
were lower than the other four subjects perhaps due to
extensive practice of the task in other experiments.
Percent change scores eliminate this between-subjects
variability and allow for more meaningful tests of
learning across subjects.
Fig. 4 shows percent change in thresholds averaged
across all five subjects. Thresholds decreased reliably
between Days 1 and 5 (average decrease, 23.09%),
t(4)9.27, PB0.001. Thresholds on Day 6, the trans-
fer day, reliably increased from Day 5 levels (average
increase, 14.02%), t(4)4.50, PB0.005.
2.3. Discussion
Practice recognizing objects led to steady improve-
ment in performance. Despite different initial
thresholds, subjects improved by similar amounts when
measured in percent change (ranging from 16 to 29%).
On average, thresholds decreased by 23% (SD5.0).
This effect is actually quite large; for a given exposure
duration performance often increased from chance to
over 75% correct. The apparent disparity between per-
formance increase and threshold decrease is due to the
steepness of the psychometric function (see Fig. 2).
Importantly, switching to unstudied objects caused a
decrement in performance. This pattern of results is
inconsistent with the hypothesis that all learning was
caused by an improvement in general perceptual abili-
ties. If subjects in Experiment 1 were only improving
their general perceptual abilities, then performance on
Days 5 and 6, for trained and untrained objects, should
have been equal. However, performance decreased fol-
lowing the change to untrained objects. But because
performance on Day 6 did not return to the untrained
levels of Day 1, some of the learning was general. The
remainder of the learning, accounting for more than
half of the decrement in thresholds, must have occurred
in mechanisms that were specific to the studied objects.
3. Experiment 1a
Perceptual learning of simple stimuli can be quite
long-lasting; for example, improved thresholds for tex-
ture segregation showed almost no changes over 22
months without intervening practice (Karni & Sagi,
1993). A follow-up to Experiment 1 replicated the basic
learning effect and tested its longevity.
Fig. 4. Experiment 1: percent change in threshold plotted as a
function of training day averaged across observers. Circles represent
data for trained objects and a cross represents data for new objects.
In this and all following graphs, error--bars show one standard error
of the mean.
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Fig. 5. Experiment 1a: percent change in threshold plotted as a
function of training day averaged across observers. Circles represent
data for trained objects and a cross represents data for new objects.
The broken line indicates a mean delay of approximately 23 days.
with training. This learning could not be accounted for
solely by an improvement in general perceptual abili-
ties. Rather, the data suggest that a substantial amount
of learning took place in mechanisms specific to the
studied objects.
However, subjects may not have improved at recog-
nition of individual objects per se, but instead, may
have learned to better discriminate between the objects
within the trained set. For example, subjects may have
learned to identify an object using some basic attribute
that no other object in the set possessed, such as its
global orientation. Such learning would be context
dependent in the sense that this improvement is tied to
an aspect of the specific experiment and might not
reflect more general improvements in object-specific
recognition. Such context-dependent learning could
have accounted for the basic learning results reported
in Experiment 1.
Experiment 2 aimed to rule out context-dependent
learning as a possible account of perceptual improve-
ment by testing whether learning generalized to a new
training context. Following training, subjects were
tested on a mixed set, of both learned and new objects.
If learning is specific to the trained context, then perfor-
mance on practiced objects should decrease when tested
in this mixed set because the other objects in the set
have changed. We expected that performance would
remain the same, adding support to the hypothesis that
learning takes place in mechanisms specific for recogni-
tion of the studied objects.
4.1. Methods
4.1.1. Participants
Five new observers participated in the experiment. All
subjects were naive to the purpose of the study, and had
no previous psychophysics experience.
4.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli and procedure were identical to those used
in Experiment 1, except that the stimuli subtended
16.412.7° visual angle.
4.1.3. Design
Experiment 2 used two overlapping sets of ten objects
each; a subset of four objects was the same in each set.
Subjects performed 300 trials on the first day of training
followed by 3 consecutive days of 600 trials each on one
object set. On Day 5, subjects were tested for 300 trials
on the second object set. The new set contained four of
the objects from the trained set and six new objects.
Object sets were counterbalanced between subjects.
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
Four new observers participated in this experiment.
3.1.2. Stimuli, Procedure, and Design
These were identical to Experiment 1, except that
subjects only trained for 4 days. On the fifth day, subjects
performed 200 trials on the trained set of objects followed
by 200 trials on a new set. After an average of 22.8
(SD2.5) days with no training, subjects were retested
on the trained set.
3.2. Results and discussion
Fig. 5 plots average change in thresholds for the
trained and untrained sets of objects. The data for the
first 5 days show the same effects that were seen in
Experiment 1. Thresholds for the trained set decreased
reliably during training (average decrease, 23.2%), t(4)
4.22, PB0.01. On the transfer day, thresholds for the
untrained set reliably increased (average difference,
12.30%), t(4)3.83, PB0.02. After 23 days, thresholds
did not increase reliably from Day 5 levels (average
difference, 2.68%), t(4)0.499, P\0.1. The fact that
thresholds remained stable, despite 3 weeks without
practice, suggests the learning may result from long-term
neural changes rather than from short-term shifts in
strategy (Karni & Sagi, 1993; Karni & Bertini, 1997).
4. Experiment 2
The two previous experiments demonstrated that
recognition of common objects improves dramatically
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4.2. Results
For each subject on each day, recognition thresholds
were calculated as described in Experiment 1. Fig. 6
shows average changes in recognition thresholds for
Experiment 2. Thresholds on Day 5 were computed
separately for both new and studied objects.
Thresholds for the trained objects decreased reliably
over the first 4 days (average decrease, 14.30%), t(4)
2.816, PB0.02. For the trained subset of objects,
thresholds between Day 4 and Day 5 were not in-
creased by a change in context, (average difference,
6.00%), t(4)1.82, P\0.05. Thresholds for the new
objects on Day 5 did not differ reliably from untrained
levels (average difference, 0.40%), t(4)0.064, P\0.1.
4.3. Discussion
If subjects had only learned to discriminate objects in
the trained set, then recognition for the trained objects
should have been more difficult in the mixed set. How-
ever, performance for the trained subset of objects
remained unchanged or even improved in the new
context. Hence, our results suggest that subjects are
doing more than simply learning to discriminate be-
tween objects in the training set. Instead, subjects are
likely to be improving at recognition for objects inde-
pendent of the training context.
This improvement remains specific to the studied
objects, replicating the basic findings of Experiments 1
and 1a. Performance for new objects on the transfer
day returned to near untrained levels.
Together, Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that learning
can occur in recognition mechanisms that are selective
for individual objects. Two alternative hypotheses have
been ruled out; learning is not solely due to improve-
ment in general perceptual abilities, nor is it specific to
the training context. In short, the learning shown here
most likely occurred in the same mechanisms that
underlie everyday object recognition. Experiment 3 fur-
ther investigates the nature of these mechanisms.
5. Experiment 3
Experiment 3 tested whether the mechanisms under-
lying object recognition are sensitive to image size.
Tests of size sensitivity have been important for both
cognitive and neural theories of object recognition. For
perceptual theorists, sensitivity to image size is a form
of viewpoint specificity; this property may help distin-
guish between two rival classes of models (Biederman &
Cooper, 1992). For neural theorists, sensitivity to image
size can help localize learning in the visual system.
Receptive fields in early cortical areas, such as V1 and
V2, are more sensitive to stimulus size than are recep-
tive fields in later visual areas such as inferior temporal
cortex (Gross & Mishkin, 1977; Schwartz, Desimone,
Albright & Gross, 1983).
This experiment measured how learning transferred
across changes in image size. Subjects studied a set of
objects for 3 days, and were then tested on images of
different sizes. Image size was either doubled or halved.
If learning is size specific, then thresholds should in-
crease when the image size changes. Alternatively, if
learning is size invariant, then thresholds should remain
the same following changes in image size.
5.1. Methods
5.1.1. Participants
Four new observers participated in the experiment.
All subjects were naive to the purpose of the study and
had no previous psychophysical experience.
5.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
The procedure was identical to that used in previous
experiments with the following exceptions. Two sets of
five objects each were used. Objects were displayed at
one of two sizes, either 16.412.7° (large) or 8.26.4°
(small). In addition, a set of 20 mask images were used
instead of the single mask image used previously. Each
of the mask images was similar to the single high-con-
trast mask used in Experiments 1 and 2, and consisted
of a series of randomly placed black and white lines on
a mean field. One image from this set was randomly
selected as the mask for each trial. Each mask sub-
tended 16.412.7° of visual angle for both large and
small targets.
Fig. 6. Experiment 2: percent change in threshold plotted as a
function of training day averaged across observers. Circles represent
data for trained objects and a cross represents data for new objects.
On Day 6 the objects were presented in a mixed set of new and
learned objects.
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Fig. 7. Experiment 3: percent change in threshold plotted as a
function of training day averaged across observers. Circles represent
data for trained objects. A dashed line indicates a change in image
size.
to rule out an alternative account of the transfer of
learning across image size.
6. Experiment 4
Throughout this paper we have argued that learning
occurs in the same mechanisms used to recognize every-
day objects under normal circumstances. In these exper-
iments, however, subjects received hundreds of trials
with the same stimuli. It is possible that training condi-
tions such as these may lead subjects to use specialized
mechanisms for recognition (Gauthier & Tarr, 1997
Schyns & Rodet, 1997; Gauthier et al., 1998; Schyns,
Goldstone & Thilbaut, 1998). Hence, the size invariance
measured in Experiment 3 may only apply when sub-
jects have become ‘experts’ for specific stimuli.
Experiment 4 was designed to rule out expertise as a
source of size invariance. Subjects were trained for just
a single day, and then tested on images of different
sizes. To further limit expertise, subjects were trained
on twice as many objects as in Experiment 3. Because




Sixteen subjects participated in this experiment. All
participants were naive to the purpose of the study.
6.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
The stimuli and procedure were the same as those
used in Experiment 3, except that the two stimulus sets
contained 20 objects each.
6.1.3. Design
Subjects trained on one set of objects viewed at one
size only. Trained object set and size were counterbal-
anced between subjects. On Day 2, subjects were tested
on the trained set and either the trained set displayed at
a different size or a new set of objects displayed at the
trained size. Subjects performed 640 trials on each day.
6.2. Results
Thresholds were calculated as in Experiment 1. Aver-
age change in thresholds for Experiment 4 are pre-
sented in Fig. 8. Thresholds decreased reliably even
after a single day of training (average decrease,
16.14%), t(7)8.52, PB0.001. As in Experiment 3,
changing object size did not reliably increase thresholds
(average difference, 4.4%), t(7)1.56, P\0.1.
Thresholds for new objects did not differ reliably from
untrained levels (average difference, 2.0%), t(7)0.545,
P\0.1.
5.1.3. Design
Subjects trained on both sets of objects with one set
displayed at each size. Trials for the two sets were
intermixed. Stimulus set and training size were counter-
balanced across subjects. Subjects trained for 640 trials
per day for 3 consecutive days. On the fourth day,
subjects were tested on 640 intermixed trials of both
sets of objects displayed at both image sizes.
5.2. Results
Thresholds were estimated for each subject on each
day as in previous experiments. Fig. 7 plots the average
changes in thresholds for Experiment 3. Because sepa-
rate analyses did not reveal any systematic differences
between small and large training stimuli, data were
averaged across trained image size. As in the previous
experiments, thresholds decreased reliably during train-
ing, (average decrease, 18.78%), t(3)12.82, PB0.003.
On day four, performance did not differ reliably be-
tween trained and untrained sizes (mean difference,
0.57%), t(3)0.207, P\0.1.
5.3. Discussion
Subjects’ performance remained unchanged despite a
two-fold increase or decrease in image size. These re-
sults suggest that learning is largely size invariant.
Experiments 1 and 2 found that learning mainly takes
place in object-specific mechanisms that support object
recognition. Experiment 3 revealed that these mecha-
nisms are not specific to image size. We will elaborate
on the implications of these results for cognitive and
neural theories in Section 7. Experiment 4 will attempt
C.S. Furmanski, S.A. Engel : Vision Research 40 (2000) 473–484480
6.3. Discussion
Despite only one day of training, learning transferred
to images of different sizes but did not transfer to new
objects. This pattern of results replicates Experiment 3.
Because subjects only trained for a single day on a
relatively large set of objects, expertise is unlikely to
account for the observed size invariance.
In order to limit the amount of learning in Experiment
4, subjects were presented with many objects, fewer total
trials, and fewer training days than in previous experi-
ments. However, despite these impediments, subjects’
performance in Experiment 4 improved as much or more
than the first day of performance in Experiments 1–3.
One reason for this might be that the actual thresholds
for Day 1 were higher in this experiment than in other
experiments reported here. Presenting the data in terms
of percent change obscured this fact. The mean threshold
on Day 1 for Experiment 4 was 55.3 ms (SD0.30),
while the mean threshold on Day 1 for Experiment 1 was
42.95 ms (SD0.63). The high initial thresholds in
Experiment 4 may allow more room for improvement
than in previous experiments.
7. General discussion
In the experiments described above, subjects improved
their ability to recognize common objects. Subjects did
not simply learn to discriminate among a particular set
of stimuli, nor did they just improve their general
perceptual abilities. The improvement in recognition was
long lasting and transferred almost completely to images
of different sizes.
7.1. Implications for theories of perceptual learning
The learning measured in our experiments resembles
perceptual learning measured in many other studies.
Most of this prior work used tasks designed to probe the
early stages of the visual system, including Vernier
hyperacuity (e.g. McKee & Westheimer, 1978; Fahle,
1994), line-segment popout (e.g. Karni & Sagi, 1991;
Ahissar & Hochstein, 1993), and complex grating dis-
crimination (Fiorentini & Berardi, 1981). Practicing these
tasks, like practicing object recognition, produces long-
lasting improvement (Karni & Sagi, 1993; Sireteanu &
Rettenbach, 1995), stimuli specificity (e.g., Ahissar &
Hochstein, 1993; Fahle, Edelman, & Poggio, 1995),
between subject variability (McKee & Westheimer, 1978;
Beard, Levi, & Reich, 1995; Fahle & Henke-Fahle, 1996),
and in some cases, size invariance (Ahissar & Hochstein,
1996). These similarities suggest that the principles of
learning uncovered in prior studies may apply to more
natural tasks such as object recognition.
While most studies of perceptual learning share these
general characteristics, differences arise in the stimulus
specificity shown for each task. These differences are
important because stimulus specificity helps localize
learning within the visual stream. For example, in some
studies using Vernier acuity and texture segregation,
learning does not transfer across eyes (Fahle et al., 1995;
Karni & Sagi, 1993). Although these results remain
controversial (Beard et al., 1995; Schoups & Orban,
1996), they would suggest that the cortical locus of
learning is at or before primary visual cortex (V1), where
information from the two eyes converge. Conversely, for
tasks such as visual search, where learning transfers well
between eyes, the likely cortical locus is in or after V1
(Ahissar & Hochstein, 1996).
Similarly, the size invariance shown here implies a
cortical locus of learning that is relatively late in the
visual stream. Single unit studies show that individual
neurons in early visual cortex (i.e., areas V1 and V2) only
respond well to stimuli of a fairly limited range of sizes
(Hubel & Wiesel, 1968). Such neurons could not provide
the basis for learning that transfers across size. Later
visual areas, such as V4, and IT, do show some size
invariance (Gross & Mishkin, 1977; Schwartz et al.,
1983), and hence are more plausible cortical loci for the
learning observed here. Related arguments have been
made about size invariance in visual search (Ahissar &
Hochstein, 1993) and priming (Biederman & Cooper,
1992).
Size invariance implies that learning may be happening
later in cortex than is required by the task alone. For
example, improved recognition could in principle result
from an increased signal-to-noise ratio in V1 neurons
that encode a specific image. Such learning would not
show size invariance, however, because large and small
images of the same objects are encoded by different
Fig. 8. Experiment 4: percent change in threshold plotted as a
function of training day averaged across observers. Circles represent
data for trained objects and a cross represents data for new objects.
A dashed line indicates a change in image size.
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populations of V1 neurons. Hence, our results do not
support the idea that learning always happens as early
as possible in the visual stream (Ahissar, Laiwand,
Kozminsky & Hochstein, 1998).
One important difference between our study and prior
work is the use of a basic-level categorization task. In
other perceptual learning studies of recognition, subjects
made difficult subordinate-level discriminations. For
example, Gauthier and Tarr (1997) presented subjects
with complex, novel objects (‘Greebles’). In this
paradigm, subjects were required to make fine discrimi-
nations among very similar exemplars of a specific object
class; subjects became Greeble experts. In other studies,
subjects trained on similar discriminations among com-
plex, novel objects (Tarr & Pinker, 1989; Edelman &
Bulthoff, 1992; Bulthoff & Edelman, 1992; Tarr, 1995;
Liu et al., 1995; Gauthier & Tarr, 1997; Gauthier et al.,
1998; Tarr & Gauthier, 1998). Our study demonstrates
that robust perceptual learning occurs for more coarse,
basic-level categorization.
Our results agree with other studies that measured
learning in category discrimination tasks. In one study,
subjects practiced discriminating between exemplars
from three classes of relatively similar, novel stimuli (Tarr
& Gauthier, 1998). Learning transferred more to other
objects sharing the same basic shape than to objects from
a different shape class. Another study also demonstrated
perceptual learning in a discrimination among a few
(two) basic-level objects (Edelman, 1995). Our results
extend these findings to more natural objects and a larger
stimulus set. We explicitly rule out mechanisms specific
for discrimination as the source of improvement in
recognition, and test for long-term learning and size-in-
variance. Our data are also in general agreement with a
large literature demonstrating perceptual learning occurs
during categorization tasks other than object recognition
(for a review, see Goldstone, 1998).
Because a single mask was used in Experiments 1 and
2, it is possible that subjects learned to discount the mask
or learned some particular interaction of the mask and
the stimulus. This seems unlikely, however, because
Experiment 3 used 20 random masks and learning was
as robust as in the previous experiments. Another possi-
ble explanation of our results is that subjects improved
the temporal resolution of general visual mechanisms
(Wolford, Marchak & Hughes, 1988). It is possible that
such an improvement may account for some of the
general learning which kept thresholds for new objects
slightly below untrained levels. But increases in general
temporal resolution can not account for the remainder
of the observed learning which is object specific.
7.2. Implications for theories of object recognition
Because learning did not transfer to the untrained
objects, it most likely occurred within neural mechanisms
that are specific for the recognition of individual objects.
The logic supporting this inference is identical to that
used in prior studies of perceptual learning. For example,
the orientation specificity of learning in a Vernier task
suggests that it is performed by mechanisms tuned for a
specific orientation (McKee & Westheimer, 1978; Kapa-
dia, Gilbert & Westheimer, 1994; Sireteanu & Retten-
bach, 1995). Similarly, the object specificity observed in
our experiments suggests that separate neural mecha-
nisms must signal the identity of different objects. On the
other hand, the learning measured here is not specific to
image size. This suggests that for any given object, the
same mechanism signals the object’s identity for both of
the tested image sizes.
The simplest explanation of our results is that learning
occurs in object specific mechanisms that receive size
invariant input. Learning in such mechanisms must
generalize across image size. This explanation is consis-
tent with models that use size invariant volumetric
features (e.g. Biederman, 1987; Hummel & Biederman,
1992). It is also consistent with models that normalize
views with respect to size before recognition (Tarr &
Pinker, 1989; Ullman, 1989; Tarr, 1995). A speculative
neural basis of the observed learning is increased output
of IT neurons as a result of strengthened inputs from
neurons with size-invariant receptive fields. This input
might arise either from neurons that encode particular
views of objects, particular parts of objects, or both, but
the inputs do not vary with image size.
Our data are more difficult to explain using object
specific mechanisms that receive input that varies with
image size. Learning in such mechanisms may be specific
to the practiced image size (Poggio & Edelman, 1990;
Edelman & Weinshall, 1991; Ullman & Basri, 1991;
Edelman, 1995; Edelman & Duvdevani-Bar, 1997; Ull-
man, 1998). In one model of this type, for example,
recognition results from interpolation between stored
views of different sizes6. In this account, learning would
be modeled most naturally as improved storage of the
trained view, causing better recognition mainly for views
of close to the practiced size. Our data exclude this basic
class of explanations, however more elaborate versions
of these models may be able to explain size invariant
learning7.
Prior studies report conflicting results about size
invariance in processing of complex stimuli. One study
6 It is of course possible that this type of model could use inputs
that have already been normalized for size. This normalization would
make the inputs to recognition size invariant, making the model a
subtype of the ones discussed in the previous paragraph.
7 For example, training could cause improved storage of all views.
Or, training could lead to improvement later in processing, for
example at a decision stage, where information from many object
specific mechanisms is combined. While such accounts are certainly
less parsimonious than size invariant input, our data can not rule
them out.
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measured priming in an object naming task and found
large amount of transfer across image size (Biederman
& Cooper, 1992). Our results are consistent with this
finding, and extend it in several ways. While priming may
be seen as an initial small amount of learning, we show
that size invariance holds for much larger amounts of
learning. For many of our subjects, recognition rates at
a given exposure duration climb from near chance levels
to over 75% correct. While it is difficult to compare these
figures to the reaction time differences reported in
priming studies, one measure of the size of effects is the
number of subjects needed to obtain statistical reliability.
Typical priming studies use tens of subjects. The current
experiments report learning that is reliable in individual
subjects. In addition, the neural mechanisms of priming
may differ from those supporting perceptual learning.
For example, priming may correspond to a temporary
multiplicative gain change (Reinitz, Wright & Loftus,
1989). The incremental nature and the longevity of
perceptual learning suggest that it is more likely to be due
to changes in synaptic weighting (Karni & Bertini, 1997).
Same-different and old-new judgments, however, are
affected by changes in image size (Bundesen & Larsen,
1975; Besner, 1983; Larsen, 1985; Jolicoeur 1987; Joli-
coeur & Besner, 1987; Ellis, Allport, Humphreys &
Collis, 1989). It seems likely that these tasks tap into
different mechanisms than those used for recognition.
For example, same-different judgments may be per-
formed using mechanisms that encode individual fea-
tures, rather than entire objects. These mechanisms could
be size dependent, and may be supported by neurons at
a relatively early stage of the visual stream. Other
possible explanations of size dependency include atten-
tional shifting between scales (Biederman & Cooper,
1992). Understanding the details of these task differences
is an important direction for future investigation.
In summary, perceptual learning in object recognition
is object specific, independent of the experimental con-
text, and size invariant. Perceptual learning can also be
used to address many other issues in basic-level recogni-
tion. Future work will examine whether learning of
objects transfers across changes in viewing angle, illumi-
nation and retinal position. Perceptual learning should
continue to be an important tool for studying the
mechanisms underlying basic-level object recognition.
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Appendix A. List of objects used in Experiments 1–4.
Experiment 1 used Sets 1a, 1b, and 1c. Experiment 2 used Sets 2a and 2b. Experiment 3 used Sets 3a and 3b at
different sizes. Experiment 4 used Sets 1a and 1b at difference sizes.
Set 2b Set 3aSet 1a Set 1b Set 1c Set 3bSet 2a
BulletBoneClock ChairApple Abacus Brush
Clock DuckBalloon Bolt CookieBanana Chair
GearForkliftCalculator Box CupCherry Clock
Dart HornChair SkullBrush Clip Computer
TruckTackHat Computer GlassesDart Cup
KeyLamp Copier Desk Fish
Lock Eraser Dolly Stapler Outlet
Megaphone Fish StaplerGlasses Scissors
Cup Magnet Key Toaster Taxi
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